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Abstract 
We estimate a New Keynesian general-equilibrium open economy model to examine how 
changes in oil prices affect the macroeconomy. Our model allows oil price changes to be 
transmitted through temporary demand and supply channels (affecting the output gap), as 
well as through persistent supply side effects (affecting trend growth). We estimate this 
model for Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States over the period 1971-
2008, and find that it matches the data very well in terms of first and second moments. 
We conclude that (i) energy prices affect the economy primarily through the supply side, 
whereas we do not find substantial demand-side effects; (ii) higher oil prices have 
temporary negative effects on both the output gap and on trend growth, which translates 
into a permanent reduction in the level of potential and actual output. Also, results for the 
United States indicate that oil supply shocks have more persistent negative effects on 
trend growth than oil demand shocks. These effects are statistically significant; however, 
our simulations also indicate that the effects are economically small. 
JEL classification: F41, Q43 
Bank classification: Economic models; Interest rates; Transmission of monetary policy; 
Productivity; Potential output 
Résumé 
Les auteurs analysent l’incidence macroéconomique des mouvements de prix du pétrole  
au moyen d’un modèle d’équilibre général en économie ouverte inspiré de la nouvelle 
économie keynésienne. Dans le modèle, l’évolution du prix de l’or noir peut avoir aussi 
bien des effets temporaires sur l’écart de production (par le canal de la demande ou de 
l’offre) que des effets persistants sur la croissance tendancielle (par le truchement de 
l’offre). Le modèle, qui est estimé pour le Canada, les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni sur 
la période 1971-2008, reproduit très bien les données étudiées, en particulier les moments 
de premier et de second ordre. Deux conclusions se dégagent du travail des auteurs : 
1)  les prix de l’énergie se répercutent sur l’économie essentiellement par le canal de 
l’offre; 2) la hausse des cours pétroliers a des retombées négatives transitoires tant sur 
l’écart de production que sur la croissance tendancielle, lesquelles se traduisent par une 
baisse permanente du niveau de production (potentielle comme effective). Aux États-
Unis, il semble que les variations de l’offre de pétrole exercent sur la croissance 
tendancielle des effets négatifs plus persistants que celles de la demande d’or noir. Ces 
effets sont statistiquement significatifs, mais les simulations réalisées indiquent qu’ils 
sont de faible ampleur du point de vue économique. 
Classification JEL : F41, Q43 
Classification de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Taux d’intérêt; Transmission de la 
politique monétaire; Productivité; Production potentielle 1 Introduction
The rapid increase in oil prices between 2002 and 2008 and their sharp decline in the
second half of 2008 has renewed the interest in the effects of energy prices on the
macroeconomy. The analysis of the macroeconomic effects of oil prices has evolved
along two distinct dimensions. On the one hand, the oil price shocks of the 1970s
and 1980s sparked a wave of empirical studies, aimed at quantifying the effects of
higher energy prices on macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inﬂation, or produc-
tivity. Most studies were purely empirical, lacked a solid theoretical basis, and the
results seem to depend crucially on the empirical approach. Depending on estimation
technique, the identiﬁcation of oil price ‘shocks’, or the sample period, very different
conclusions can be drawn. On the other hand, theoretical studies have investigated dif-
ferent channels through which energy prices might affect macroeconomic outcomes.
While these studies provide important insights regarding the transmission of energy
price changes, the practical relevance of the different theoretical channels is not always
clear, given the lack of empirical evidence.
Building on this work, we combine theory and empirics. We develop and estimate
a semi-structural New-Keynesian model of an open-economy in the spirit of Lubik and
Schorfheide (2007), in which oil price changes can be transmitted through multiple
channels. Our model allows oil prices to have temporary and persistent effects on
output through the supply and the demand sides of the economy. More speciﬁcally, we
allow oil to shift the IS curve to proxy for temporary demand-side effects, to affect the
Phillips curve to capture inﬂationary effects through the supply side, and to affect the
growth rate of potential output, which generates persistent effect on the growth rate.
The combination of all three channels will determine the endogenous monetary policy
response in the model. Using a state space approach, the estimated version of the
model for the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom matches key features of
the data very well. We then use the model to investigate the importance of energy price
changes on GDP, inﬂation, and trend growth. This analysis is done from the perspective
of a central bank, aiming to fully understand how interest rates should respond to a
change in energy prices. We also investigate the consequences of setting interest rates
‘incorrectly’, that is, by not taking into account all channels through which energy
prices affect economic outcomes.
Our ﬁndings differ from the existing literature in several important ways. First, in
contrast to Hamilton (1988), our approach indicates that higher oil prices affect the
2macroeconomy primarily through the supply side, not the demand side. This supports
the notion that higher oil prices have effects similar to negative technology shocks, in
that higher oil prices lower ﬁrm output in terms of value-added for a given input of
capital and labor (in line with Rasche and Tatom, 1977; Bruno, 1984). Second, we
ﬁnd that higher oil prices have short-term effects on the output gap, but also longer-
term effects by temporarily lowering trend growth, which reduces the level of GDP
permanently. While these effects are statistically signiﬁcant, the impact is small, so
their economic importance is limited, even for substantial oil price movements. Our
analysis also shows that even if central banks do not correctly identify the relationship
between oil prices and growth, the resulting policy error is likely to be relatively minor.
Lastly, robustness check indicate that observed changes in energy intensity over time
do not affect our conclusions, and we also do not ﬁnd evidence that oil prices have
asymmetric effects on the economy.
Before we outline our model, we brieﬂy review the effects of oil prices on key
macroeconomic variables in models employed by central banks and policymakers, and
contrasts these predictions with the academic literature. Our empirical results are pre-
sented in section 3, before we summarize our key insights in section 4.
2 The relationship between oil prices and the macro-
economy
2.1 Related literature
The relationship between energy prices and macroeconomy has been investigated us-
ing several approaches. We can distinguish between empirical studies with limited
economic theory, and theoretical studies, with limited empirical applications. Also, the
implications from both types of studies have changed substantially over time.
The oil price shocks of the 1970s and 1980s, and the subsequent global recession,
sparked a wave of empirical studies. Focusing on oil price shocks in the 1970s and
1980s, early empirical studies tended to ﬁnd a negative relationship between oil prices
and real activity (e.g. Hamilton, 1983; Hulten, 1989).1 However, this relationship was
1As Barsky and Kilian (2004) note, there is a widespread belief that exogenous political events in the
Middle East causes recessions in industrialized economies through the effect on oil prices, even though the
empirical evidence on this link is weak. Huntington (2005) provides a recent survey.
3increasingly questioned in the mid-1980s, when energy prices dropped sharply, with-
out subsequent increase in economic activity. In response, several empirical studies
suggested that the impact of energy prices on the macroeconomy was not symmetric,
and measured oil price shocks, based on the notion that oil price increases should have
negative effects on growth, while falling oil prices may only yield small boosts to GDP
(see Mork, 1989; Hooker, 1983; Hamilton, 1996).2 Still, by the late 1990s, a consensus
began emerging in the literature that there might be a negative relationship between oil
prices and real activity, but its magnitude is likely to be small (Jones et al., 2004).3
Lastly, several empirical studies have focused on the role of monetary policy in re-
sponding to oil price shocks (Bernanke et al., 1997; Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Cologni
and Manera, 2008), examining whether central banks tighten monetary policy to avoid
inﬂationary effects, or support economic growth by lowering interest rates.
The second strand of the literature is been based on economic theory. Like the em-
pirical literature, the ﬁndings from the theoretical contributions changed over time, and
theoretical studies do not provide a clear picture whether oil prices should or should
not have substantial effects on the macroeconomy. For instance, Kliesen (2008) shows
that the price elasticity of the demand for oil is low in the short-term, because ﬁrms
and consumers cannot change their production or consumption patterns immediately,
so the effects of higher oil prices on GDP might be small (at least initially). In that
case, the negative demand shock for energy-intensive goods may cause substantial re-
allocation of labour, which – if costly – can have a large impact on the overall economy
even if oil as share of GDP is low. In Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), monopolistic
producers can increase their mark-ups during oil price shocks, depressing output, and
Finn (2000) models variations in utilization rates for productive capital as a function of
energy use, ﬁnding that oil price shocks causes sharp, simultaneous declines in energy
use and capital utilization with large effects on output.4 Lastly, the explanation of why
the fall in energy prices in the 1980s failed to spur economic growth points to asym-
metric effects, arising through (at least) two important channels (Jimenez-Rodriguez
2Hamilton (1996) and Guo and Kliesen (2008) proxy oil price shocks by the difference between the
current oil price and the maximum price in the past 4 or 12 months (see also our robustness check in the
appendix); Kilian (2008a, 2008b) uses a production-based measure to capture the difference between actual
oil production and a ‘counterfactual’ path in the absence of exogenous production shortfalls (triggered by
wars, for instance).
3Blanchard and Gali (2007) claim that the mild effects on inﬂation and economic activity of the oil price
increase in the early 2000s are due to good luck – lack of concurrent adverse shocks – smaller shares of oil
in production, more ﬂexible labor markets, and better monetary policies.
4In this regard a puzzle is that sharp increases in oil prices should render (part of) the existing, energy-
intensive capital stock obsolete. One would expect lower prices for used equipment after an oil price shock,
but earlier empirical studies have failed to conﬁrm this hypothesis (Hulten et al. 1989; Bohi, 1991).
4and Sanchez, 2005): ﬁrst by rending parts of the existing capital stock obsolete, any
change in energy prices requires costly adjustment.5 The second channel is a negative
demand shock when energy price increase, or a positive demand shock when energy
prices fall.6 Also, both shocks interact, as the impact of the positive demand shock
from falling energy prices is reduced by the need to adjust the capital shock.
Two other features of the literature are noteworthy. First, narrative studies such
as Olson (1988) claim that the cost of oil as a part of GDP is too small to have large
macroeconomic effects. Lastly, a remarkable disconnect is observable between recent
empirical studies that suggest that oil price changes have very limited effects, and the
effects predicted in important macroeconomic models, such as those employed by the
IMF, the European Commission, the Bank of Canada or the European Central Bank,
which all suggest that oil price ﬂuctuationss have substantial macroeconomic effects.
For instance, comparing different models, Roeger (2005) reports that over a 3-year
horizon, the effects of a 50 percent increase in oil prices on GDP growth range between
-0.5 percentage points (OECD’s Interlink model) to -2.3 percentage points (NIGEM).7
While we are not aware of studies that estimate a general equilibrium model to in-
vestigate the impact of energy price changes over history, three studies are relatively
close to ours. First, Bodenstein et al. (2008) develop a general equilibrium model that
includes oil prices. However, while we estimate our model, their model is calibrated, to
investigate optimal monetary policy in response to an energy price increase for two dif-
ferent inﬂation measures (core and headline inﬂation). Second, Elekdag et al. (2008)
build a ﬁve-country DSGE model with production and trade of crude oil. Rather than
estimating the effect of oil prices over history, however, these authors study the factors
driving oil prices. Third, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) estimate a structural model
to test whether central banks respond to exchange rate movements. While our study
differs in terms of topic, the methodology we employ is very similar, in that we esti-
mate a general equilibrium model and simulate the model for different ways to conduct
monetary policy.
5Jones et al. (2004) review studies using highly disaggregated data. The combined impression conveyed
by these studies suggest extensive reallocation of labour after an oil price shocks, which occurs at the 4-digit
SIC level (and consequently is hard to detect in more aggregated data). This suggests that the effect of high
energy prices extends beyond the small share of oil in the economy.
6Even if the importance of oil as a share of GDP is small, higher oil prices can still act as an important
negative demand shock, if it depresses purchases of energy-intensive goods with large dollar values, such as
cars (Hamilton 1988).
7Similarly, a recent survey of the effect of oil in macroeconomic models employed by institutions like the
IMF by Huntington (2005) suggest that an increase of $10 per barrel in the price of oil is expected to reduce
U.S. output by about 0.25 percentage points in the ﬁrst year.
52.2 Oil and trend growth
We propose a simple macroeconomic model to evaluate the effects of oil prices on the
economy with a monetary policy response in the spirit of the current DSGE literature
(see for instance Gali, 2008). We employ a very general treatment with regard to how
oil prices affect the economy, allowing effects on trend growth (supply side), the output
gap (demand side), and inﬂation.
Consider how oil prices affect a ﬁrm’s production ﬁrst. Assume a representative
ﬁrm that producesY units of a single ﬁnal good using capital (K), labor (L), and oil (O)
as inputs. In the short term, technology is ﬁxed, represented by the following (aggre-
gate) linearly homogeneous, twice continuously differentiable production function:8
Y = F(K;L;O): (1)
Taking the price of inputs as given, a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm will hire inputs up to
the point in which their marginal product is equal to their real price (i.e., relative to
the aggregate price of Y). In particular, for the case of oil, this optimal condition is
¶F=¶O = p. It implies a demand function of the following form:
O = Y(K;L;p); (2)
where p is the real price of oil and ¶Y=¶p < 0. Let y =Y   pO represent the ﬁrm’s
output in terms of value added. Substituting (1) and (2) into the expression for y gives:
y = F(K;L;Y(K;L;p))  pY(K;L;p) =
= f(K;L;p): (3)
It is easy to show that ¶y=¶p < 0.9 In other words, the production function in terms
8If sustained, ﬁrms are likely to respond to changes in oil prices by adopting different technologies. We
abstract from these longer-term effects.



























 Y(K;L;p) =  Y(K;L;p) < 0 (5)
6of value added, f(K;L;p), suggests that changes in oil prices have macroeconomic ef-
fects similar to negative shifts in total factor productivity (‘technological regress’). In
a factor-price frontier framework, this analogy is developed in more detail in Rasche
and Tatom (1977) and Bruno (1984).10 Consider, for example, the possibility that oil
prices affect transportation costs. Cheap transportation enables geographical disper-
sion of production, which is arguably one of the elements underlying globalization.
Sharp increases in energy prices could drive up transportation costs, slowing down or
partly reversing the incentives to specialize, and thus putting downward pressure on
productivity growth. In a similar vein, for given inputs of capital and labour, higher
oil prices reduces the value added of production. This is similar to a fall in total factor
productivity.
2.3 Building a semi-structural, New Keynesian model
In what follows, we incorporate this notion into a New Keynesian macroeconomic
model to assess the effect of oil prices on potential (or trend) output growth. We do
not develop a fully-ﬂedged DSGE model, but use a structure similar to Gali (2008) as
a basis for our empirical model.
We start by incorporating the notion that higher oil prices can have effects compa-
rable to technological regress. Let yt, and yT
t represent value-added measures of actual
and potential (or trend) output, and denote their growth rates by gt and gT
t , respectively.
We interpret yT
t as the level of output that would take place in a balanced growth path
of a frictionless economy (that is, without nominal rigidities, see Woodford, 2003). In
addition, assume that the output gap, ˆ yt, is deﬁned as the log-difference between actual
and potential output:
ˆ yt = logyt  logyT
t ; (6)
where
yt = (1+gt)yt 1 (7)
and






Combining equations (6)-(8), gt is a function of gT
t and the change in ˆ yt:
(1+gt) = (1+gT
t )exp(ˆ yt   ˆ yt 1) (9)
To capture the effect of oil prices on yt, yT
t , and ˆ yt, let the law of motion for the










where rg 2 (0;1) is an auto-regressive coefﬁcient, g is a constant that maps into the
stationary value of gT
t , pt denotes the real price of oil, and e
g
t  N(0;sg) is an i.i.d.
shock that will have temporary effects on the growth rate, but permanent effects on
the level of potential output.11 Estimates of l then provide the impact of oil prices on
potential at different leads and lags.
We interpret the auto-regressive part of gT
t as (exogenously) capturing the time-
path of standard determinants of growth, such as technological progress, increase in
labour productivity, population growth, physical and human capital accumulation etc.
(Aghion and Hewitt, 2009). At the same time, we explicitly allow oil prices to affect
trend growth through parameter lg. In line with section 2.2, we expect lg < 0, reﬂect-
ing the analogy between increases in oil prices and technological regress on potential
output. In the model, this is the ﬁrst possible channel through which oil prices affect
the economy.
The second channel through which oil prices can affect the economy is through
the supply side, that is through the traditional Phillips curve, which maps (log) devia-
tions of actual inﬂation (pt) from trend (or targeted) inﬂation pT
t to the current level of
the output gap (yt=yT
t = exp(ˆ yt)), past and expected deviations of inﬂation from trend
inﬂation, and oil prices:




























where vt  N(0;sn) is an i.i.d. supply shock. We expect bp > 0, as higher oil prices
should contribute to increase marginal costs and inﬂation, for a given level of slackness
in the economy.
Lastly, oil prices can affect the demand-side. We allow for the possibility that all
else equal, higher oil prices shift the IS curve to the left. In our open economy model,
the output gap curve is a function of its lagged value, the real interest rate (rt), the real
exchange rate (st), the detrended foreign output gap (ˆ y
t ), and oil prices:






where et  N(0;se) is an i.i.d. demand shock, rt = Rt=Etpt+1 is deﬁned as the ratio of
the nominal interest rate(Rt) to inﬂation expectations for t+1 (conditional on informa-
tion up to timet); and the real exchange rate is represented by st, determined according











t+1 is the foreign real interest rate, and ut is a UIP-shock following
a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process; R
t and p
t+1 are the foreign nominal interest rate
and inﬂation rate, respectively.
The monetary policy rule ‘closes’ the model. We assume that the central bank sets
the nominal interest rate in reaction to (log) deviations of inﬂation and output from





















where the trend for the interest rate (RT
t  rSSpT
t ), or the ‘natural’ interest rate, is
9deﬁned as the product of the steady-state level of the real interest rate (rSS) and trend
inﬂation. eR
t  N(0;sR) is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
The baseline model endogenously determines dynamic paths for yt, yT
t , gt, gT
t , ˆ yt,
Rt, st, and rt. For the three foreign variables, trend inﬂation, and the UIP shock we
assume exogenous AR(1) processes, such that:
zt = (1 rz)zSS+rzzt 1+ez
t; (14)
where subscript SS denotes steady-state values and ez
t N(0;sz), for z=logy, logR,
logp, logpT, ut.
As regards the determination of oil prices, we make a distinction between the
United States on the one hand, and Canada and the United Kingdom on the other.
For the latter two countries, it is reasonable to assume that oil prices are exogenous.
This is equivalent to saying that their oil consumption and oil supply are too small to




However, the United States is an exception, in that domestic output, relative to global
output, is large enough to inﬂuence oil prices. To allow for an endogenous response
of oil prices to U.S. growth, we replace eq. (15) by the following two equations for
world oil supply and U.S. (net) oil demand when estimating the model for the U.S.
economy:12
World net oil supply: logQt = (1 rQS)logQ+rQSlogQt 1+lppt 1+e
QS
t(16)
U.S. net oil demand: logQt = f0+fggT







t allow us to simulate world net oil supply and U.S. oil demand
shocks separately. To allow for correlations between world supply shocks and U.S. oil




t to the remaining AR(1) processes
12We also estimated the model under the assumption that the United States is a price taker on the global
oil market. This modiﬁcation does not change our results materially.









To illustrate how a central bank sets interest rates in our model, consider how an in-
crease in oil prices affects the economy (ﬁgure 1). We allow for oil prices to affect
trend growth, as well as the output gap. The inﬂationary impact of higher oil prices
occurs directly through trend growth (eq. 10) and through the supply side (the Phillips
curve, eq. 11). In addition, higher oil prices also affect inﬂation indirectly through
the demand side (the IS curve, eq. 12).13 The combination of all three channels will
determine the monetary policy response (eq. 13). While these three channels exists for
all countries, note that an additional feedback is present for the United States, as we
allow for an endogenous response from the macroeconomy to changes in oil prices.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Estimation and model validation
The model has 13 equations, 11 shocks, and 33 parameters (14 equations, 12 shocks
and 34 parameters for the United States with endogenous oil prices).14 To estimate
the model, we write it in state-space form and use the Kalman ﬁlter to estimate by
maximum likelihood. We use quarterly data from 1971Q1 to 2008Q1 for the United
States and Canada (1975Q1 to 2008Q1 for the United Kingdom) for the following
observable variables: gt, R, R, y, s, p, p, p, plus – for the United States – U.S.
oil imports Q. All variables have been detrended using an Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.15
Lastly, preliminary tests showed that leads and lags of oil prices are not statistically
signiﬁcant in the equations for potential growth, the Phillips curve or the IS curve.
Therefore, in our ﬁnal speciﬁcation, oil prices enter in eq. (10), (11) and (12), only
contemporaneously.
13Additional effects occur through the exchange rate, which in turn feed back onto the IS curve and the
Phillips curve.
14Note that our model is estimated for a ‘home country’, which may be a small-open economy (Canada
and the United Kingdom) or a large economy (United States), not a multi-country model.
15Note that for all economies, oil prices enter in U.S. dollar terms. We could use oil prices in local
























(only for the United States)
Figure 1: Transmission channels
The estimated model matches the data remarkably well. Table 1 shows for each
country the relative volatility of key economic variables (x) over the volatility of output
growth, s(x)=s(gt), and the covariance of variables x with output growth, s(x;gt)).
Differences between the model and the actual data are very small. Formal tests indicate
that the observed and model data are not statistically different along these dimensions
(see appendix A.2).
Table 2 tests the difference between observed and model data reported in table 1
statistically. For each country, the ﬁrst column tests whether the correlation coefﬁcient
between our estimated series and output growth is statistically different from the actual
data, and the second column tests for differences in variance between estimated series
12s(x)=s(gt) s(x;gt)
Series (x) Model Data Model Data
United States
Exchange Rate 4.48 4.57 -0.10 -0.05
Inﬂation 0.63 0.67 -0.15 -0.12
Interest Rates 0.50 0.53 -0.25 -0.21
Oil Prices 22.32 23.95 -0.27 -0.26
Oil Imports 9.85 11.67 0.09 0.11
United Kingdom
Exchange Rate 7.84 9.41 0.23 0.20
Inﬂation 1.00 1.10 -0.38 -0.37
Interest Rates 0.49 0.53 -0.31 -0.26
Oil Prices 21.87 26.36 -0.27 -0.30
Canada
Exchange Rate 3.93 4.39 0.02 0.00
Inﬂation 0.62 0.69 -0.23 -0.22
Interest Rates 0.44 0.49 -0.33 -0.30
Oil Prices 22.50 24.87 -0.15 -0.10
Table 1: Relative variances and covariances in the data and the model
and the data.16 None of the estimated moments are signiﬁcantly different from the
empirical moments in the data. Table 2 reports autocorrelation coefﬁcients in the data,
and compares them to our model-generated coefﬁcients. Again, they are very similar.
Taken together, these ﬁndings provide an indication that our model captures underlying
macroeconomic relationships very well.
3.2 Results
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates and table 4 shows the estimated parameters for
the shock processes for the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. Param-
eters for which we do not report p-values – such as the effect of foreign output on
demand for the United States – were calibrated at zero, because they were not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Let us ﬁrst discuss how the model replicates standard macroeconomic
relationships, before we examine the impact of oil prices in more detail.
Table 3 shows that in all three countries, monetary policy reacts to higher inﬂation
16For test of mean, the F-test is consistent with t-test, Satterthwaite-Welch t-test and Welch F-test (re-
ported statistic is Anova F-test); for the test of variance, the reported F-test is consistent with Siegel-Turkey,
Bartlett, Levene and Brown-Forsythe tests.
131 lag AR(1) 2 lags AR(2)
Model Data Model Data
United States
Growth 0.29 0.21 0.18 0.09
Exchange Rate 0.81 0.79 0.59 0.55
Inﬂation 0.39 0.40 0.01 0.02
Interest Rates 0.81 0.81 0.55 0.54
Oil supply 0.74 0.77 0.44 0.46
Oil demand 0.41 0.42 0.09 0.04
United Kingdom
Growth 0.03 -0.14 0.20 0.08
Exchange Rate 0.77 0.77 0.53 0.52
Inﬂation 0.34 0.34 0.17 0.17
Interest Rates 0.83 0.83 0.58 0.58
Oil Prices 0.76 0.78 0.44 0.49
Canada
Growth 0.36 0.21 0.15 -0.01
Exchange Rate 0.79 0.78 0.53 0.52
Inﬂation 0.24 0.24 -0.05 -0.04
Interest Rates 0.82 0.82 0.56 0.56
Oil Prices 0.74 0.77 0.44 0.46
Table 2: Autocorrelation coefﬁcients
14and higher output by raising interest rates (positive values for rp and ry). The Phillips
curve indicates that higher oil prices or a positive output gap lead to higher inﬂation in
the short term (positive values for bp and by). Domestic output – the IS curve – reacts
negatively to higher real interest rates (gr) and positively to a depreciation of the real
exchange rate (gs) for all three countries; for Canada and the United Kingdom, higher
foreign output also boosts demand (gy).
As regards the effect of oil prices, oil prices do not enter the IS curve in any of
the three countries, which is why we dropped the parameter gp in table 3. In con-
trast, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant, positive effects of oil prices on the Phillips curve (bp). This
suggests that most of the short-term macroeconomic effects occur through the supply
side. Lastly, higher oil prices have small, yet signiﬁcant effects on trend growth (lg).
In the model for the United States with endogenous oil prices, U.S. oil demand re-
acts positively to higher U.S. growth (fy) and negatively to higher oil prices (fp).17
Lastly, a past increase to the price of oil leads to an increase of world oil supply (lp).
To check the model performance without oil at all, we also conduct likelihood ratio
tests, whereby we restrict oil price-related coefﬁcients to zero and then compare the
restricted and unrestricted model. The results in table 5 suggest that despite oil prices
having a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the macroeconomy through the supply side,
these effects are likely to be small (even in the short run), since the restricted model is
not rejected by the data.
Comparing the estimates between countries, we ﬁnd that the Canadian IS curve
reacts more strongly to changes in foreign output than the United Kingdom (gy), and
the shock to foreign output is most persistent for Canada (reﬂected by the highest value
of ry). This likely reﬂects that Canada is the most open economy of all G7 countries.
In contrast, shocks to foreign inﬂation and the foreign interest rate (parameters rp,
rR) have relatively similar effects in all three economies. Also, our ﬁndings indicate
that the effect of higher oil prices on trend growth (lg) is the highest for the United
Kingdom, followed by the United States and Canada.18
To examine the effects of oil prices on the different economies in more detail, table
6 shows the variance decomposition to oil-related shocks. We would like to highlight
17This does not contradict Kilian and Vega (2008), who fail to ﬁnd evidence that oil prices respond
to macroeconomic news, as we do not distinguish between anticipated developments and macroeconomic
‘news’.
18We also tested for a possible structural break in the relationship between oil and macroeconomy for
Canada in the early 1990s, when Canada moved from being a net energy importer to a net energy exporter.
Our tests rejected presence of a structural break.
15United States United Kingdom Canada
Parameter Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Potential Output Growth
g 0.0202 0.0006 0.0171 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000
rg 0.2526 0.0019 0.0000 0.3539 0.0000
lg -0.0094 0.0083 -0.0115 0.0000 -0.0058 0.0909
Monetary Policy Rule
rR 0.6663 0.0000 0.9079 0.0000 0.9025 0.0000
rp 0.7772 0.0938 0.1342 0.0000 0.3871 0.0027
ry 0.0981 0.0646 0.0140 0.0036 0.0466 0.0278
Supply (Phillips Curve)
b0 0.7275 0.0000 0.6775 0.0000 0.8495 0.0000
by 0.6323 0.0069 0.7479 0.1016 1.4549 0.0147
bpt 1 0.2651 0.0001 0.3158 0.0003 0.1408 0.0534
bpt+1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
bp 0.0074 0.0010 0.0067 0.0807 0.0097 0.0000
Demand (IS Curve)
gy 0.0419 0.1247 0.4233 0.0001 0.0000
gr -0.0563 0.0002 -0.0221 0.0007 -0.0576 0.0091
gs 0.0566 0.0002 0.0163 0.0000 0.0360 0.0066
gy 0.0000 0.0059 0.0680 0.0220 0.0460
Oil Prices (treated as exogenous)





World Net Oil Supply
rQS 0.3767 0.0000
lp 0.0225 0.0033
Likelihood -4,276.6 -3,697.2 -4,241.3
Obs. 149 133 149
d.f. 121 108 125
Note: Parameters for which we do not report t-statistics are calibrated by conducting a grid
search: we estimates all parameters, conditional on the calibrated parameter value, and
picked the calibration that yielded the highest maximum likelihood.
Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimates of the structural parameters
16United States United Kingdom Canada
Parameter Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
AR(1) components
ry 0.5211 0.0000 0.5337 0.0000 0.8519 0.0000
rp 0.1535 0.0084 0.2431 0.0069 0.1219 0.0667
rR 0.8695 0.0000 0.7921 0.0000 0.8660 0.0000
rm 0.7580 0.0000 0.5819 0.0000 0.6679 0.0000
apS -0.0073 0.0636
apD 0.0026 0.0856
ap 0.0062 0.0039 0.0171 0.0000
ay 0.0129 0.0497 -0.0098 0.0522




t 0.0077 0.0000 0.0074 0.0000 0.0075 0.0000
v 0.0044 0.0000 0.0071 0.0000 0.0047 0.0000
eR
t 0.0171 0.1126 0.0024 0.0000 0.0056 0.0087
e
y
t 0.0105 0.0000 0.0081 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000
ep
t 0.0037 0.0000 0.0023 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000
eR
t 0.0013 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000
e
m
t 0.0017 0.0000 0.0138 0.0000 0.0039 0.0000
e
p







Obs 149 133 149
d.f. 121 108 125
Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates of AR(1) coefﬁcients and standard deviation
of shocks
Likelihood ratio p-value
United States 0.084 0.99
UK 0.001 0.99
Canada 0.007 0.99
Table 5: Likelihood ratio tests, comparing the model with and without oil
17Shock ˆ y gt gT
t pt Rt pt
United States e
QS
t 0.19 2.26 2.20 2.47 2.09 51.86
e
QD
t 0.10 1.74 1.68 1.91 0.72 47.84
UK e
p
t 1.93 6.05 6.02 3.34 3.00 100.00
Canada e
p
t 4.09 2.24 2.05 5.98 1.77 100.00
Table 6: Variance decomposition of oil price shocks
tworesults. First, comparingtheresultsforCanadaandtheUnitedKingdom, oilshocks
havearelativelylargeeffectontrendgrowthintheUnitedKingdom, whereastheCana-
dian effect occurs primarily through the output gap (and is thus temporary). Consistent
with this, the inﬂationary impact of oil price changes is also bigger in Canada, and a
larger share of the variation in interest rates in the UK can be explained by oil shocks
(this is consistent with oil shocks having a bigger inﬂationary impact in Canada.) Sec-
ond, our U.S. model also allows examining the differences in effects of oil supply and
oil demand shocks. We ﬁnd that variation in the price of oil are almost equally at-




t , respectively), and,
as a rule of thumb, a larger portion of the variation in the output gap and trend growth
is attributable to oil supply shocks than to oil demand shocks. This is not surprising,
given that oil supply shocks are more persistent and therefore have a bigger impact on
U.S. inﬂation.
3.3 The effect of a shock to oil prices
As a graphical way to gauge the model’s performance, let us look at impulse-response
functions for a 10 per cent increase in oil prices. Consider Canada and the United
Kingdom, the two countries for which oil prices are exogenous. In ﬁgure 2, shocks
have been calibrated so that in both cases the price of oil increases by 10 per cent to
facilitate comparison (all graphs are in percentage points deviations from the steady
state). As indicated before, the effect on the output gap are substantially larger for
Canada than for the United Kingdom, whereas the effect on trend growth is larger for
the United Kingdom. This implies that in response to an oil price shock, the effects
on the Canadian economy occur relatively more through a temporary opening up of a
negative output gap, whereas the effects on the United Kingdom are relatively more
long-lasting, as they occur through lower potential growth. Second, Canadian inﬂa-
tion increases by more than UK inﬂation, which is consistent with Canadian monetary
policy reacting less to energy price increases (for both countries, real interest rates are




























































Figure 2: The effect of a 10 per cent increase in oil prices for Canada and the United
Kingdom (effects shows in percentage point deviations from the steady state)
initially negative, which indicates that the monetary policy response is not aggressive
enough to lower real interest rates). Note, however, that Canadian inﬂation reverts
faster back to its pre-shock level. This is because the Canadian exchange rate appreci-
ates not only by more in response to higher oil prices than the UK exchange rate, but
also the appreciation is much faster, helping to bring down inﬂation.19
Given that we have endogenized oil prices for the United States, we can simulate
the effects of oil demand shocks and oil supply shocks for U.S. variables separately.
Figure 3 shows two impulse response function, one simulating a shock to oil demand,
one to oil supply (both have been scaled such that the resulting increase in the price of
oil is also 10 per cent for both shocks). Conﬁrming the results of Kilian (2009), not
all oil price shocks are alike, as the source of the shock matters and oil price increases
19The exchange rate reactions are in line with Cayen et al. (2008) who have found that higher commodity
prices tend to appreciate the real exchange rates of both currencies.































































Demand Shock Supply Shock
Figure 3: The macroeconomic effects of oil demand and oil supply shocks for the
United States (effects shows in percentage point deviations from the steady state)
driven by negative supply shocks have different effects than higher prices driven up
by higher demand for oil. In our model, a strong oil demand shock can be thought
of as an increase in the energy intensity of production, that is, for a given output,
more energy is required, driving up the demand for oil (and thus oil prices). Negative
supplyshockshavemuchmorepersistenteffectsontrendgrowth, andleadtoastronger
reduction in growth. Negative oil supply shocks also lead to a much larger monetary
policy reaction, but real interest rates are negative, suggesting that the monetary policy
reaction is simulative – not surprising in light of the relatively larger output effects.
In constrast, monetary policy increases real interest rates in response to a positive oil















Canada UK US - Oil supply shock US - Oil demand shock
Figure 4: The effect of a 10 per cent oil price shock on the level of GDP
Lastly, note that while the estimated effects on growth rates are small, changes in
oil prices may have non-negligible macroeconomic impacts, as changes in oil prices
have permanent effects on the level of GDP. Consider ﬁgure 4, which shows the level
of GDP and the level of trend GDP after an 10 per cent oil price increase. As can be
seen, the effects are permanent, that is, lower the level of GDP permanently, ranging
from from a drop of roughly 0.4 per cent in the United Kingdom to a drop of 0.1 per
cent for a shock to oil prices from lower demand in the United States.
3.4 What if the central bank makes a mistake?
As shown, the impact of changes in energy prices on the level of GDP are permanent
and signiﬁcantly different from zero. This means that an optimal monetary policy
should take into account the short-term, as well as the long-term effect on economic
activity. Higher energy prices have short-term effects through the output gap, but they
also lower trend growth. Not identifying these transmission channels correctly could
imply that the output gap is calculated incorrectly, and interest rates could possibly be
set inappropriately low, as the amount of excess supply after a positive energy price
increase is overestimated. What would be the economic consequences of the central
21bank making this ‘policy error’?
In what follows, we take the example of Canada and simulate the central bank’s
policy response to a 10 per cent increase in oil prices under three different assumptions:
 ﬁrst, the central bank correctly identiﬁes the negative effect of higher energy
prices through all channels of the model (‘correct policy response’);
 second, the central bank identiﬁes the temporary short-term effects on the output
gap through shifts of the IS curve correctly, but fails to take into account the
longer-term effects through trend growth (‘mild policy error’);
 third, the central bank fails to identify both the negative effects of higher oil
prices through the IS curve and the negative effect on trend growth (‘severe pol-
icy error’).
Table 7 show the relative volatility of key economic variables under the different
scenarios, where volatility under the ‘correct’ response has been normalized to 1. In
the ‘mild policy error’ case, volatility of all economic variables increases (except the
interest rate, which is set by monetary policy), as the central bank overestimates trend
growth and consequently miscalculates the output gap. As potential output is overes-
timated, the central bank sets interest rates too low. Conversely, in the ‘severe policy
error’ scenario, the central bank miscalculates both trend output and the output gap,
and by not taking into account that rising oil prices have slowed the economy, the en-
tire fall in output is attributed to the output gap. Consequently, interest rates are set too
high, which results in low inﬂation, but ampliﬁes the volatility in output, relative to the
case in which the central bank makes no mistake.
Figure 5 shows the estimated central bank responses under the different scenarios.
As can be seen, the difference between the ‘correct’ policy response and the case in
which the effects on the IS curve are correctly identiﬁed, but the lower trend growth
is not recognized, are small. To give a sense of the magnitude of the monetary policy
response under a severe oil price shock, suppose that oil prices increase by 100 per
cent in a single quarter. Under the ‘correct’ response, this would lead to an increase
in Canadian interest rates of 15 bps. If the central bank makes a ‘mild policy error’,
interest rates are only raised by 7 bps.20 The difference in the interest rate response
20Even more dramatic, assume that the 600 per cent increase witnessed between 2002 and early 2008
occured in one quarter. Our simulations indicate that in this case, the peak impact on monetary policy rates
would be 90 bps under the correct response and 45 basis points under the ‘mild policy error’ case. These
differences are fairly small.
22Volatility, relative to ‘correct response’ ‘Mild policy error’ ‘Severe policy error’
Interest rate 89% 282%
Output gap 110% 118%
Inﬂation 103% 81%
Exchange rate 103% 100%
Volatility for each variable has been set to 100 per cent under the ‘correct’ response.
Table 7: Note: Volatility of key macroeconomic variables if the central bank makes a
policy mistake (Canada)
reﬂects that the central bank overestimates the slack in the economy by not taking into
account that the growth rate of potential has fallen in response to higher oil prices, and
therefore is not sufﬁcient restrictive in its monetary policy response.
The response of the central bank to an increase in energy prices under the ‘severe
policy error’ scenario differs more substantially from the ‘correct’ response. Where
interest rates should be set about 15 bps higher under the correct response to a 100 per
cent increase in oil prices in a quarter, the central bank raises interest rates by more
than 60bps under a ‘severe policy error’.
Taken together, they key message from this exercise is that even during severe oil
price shocks, central banks are not likely to amplify economic volatility dramatically,
even if interest rates were set incorrectly. Admittedly, there is the risk that interest rates
are not set optimally if the central bank estimates incorrectly the economic effects of
higher oil prices. However, we would like to point out two additional considerations.
First, our assumption of an increase in oil prices by 100 per cent is fairly extreme.
Second, given uncertainties about the ‘correct’ level of interest rates even absent major
economic shocks, it seems that changes in oil prices account for major policy mistakes,
even if the central bank is somewhat over- or underestimating the effects of higher oil
prices on trend growth or the output gap.
4 Conclusion
Theperiodofhighvolatilityinoilmarketsbetween2002and2008hasrenewedinterest
in the analysis of energy prices. Central banks are interested in the macroeconomic
effects of changes to oil prices, since the appropriate monetary policy reaction to higher
energy prices depends on the correct identiﬁcation of its macroeconomic impact, which





















































Correct response Mild policy error Severe policy error
Figure 5: Correct policy responses and central bank ‘policy errors’ for Canada (effects
shows in percentage point deviations from the steady state)
24requires an understanding of the transmission channels. Unfortunately, most existing
studies employ either a empirical approach with little theoretical underpinnings, or a
primarily theoretical approach with limited empirical application.
Our study estimates a simple model, inspired by the New Open Macroeconomy
literature. We allow for the possibility that oil prices affect the macroeconomy in the
short-term through demand and supply side effects, but also through more persistent
supply side effects. As our model replicates key features of the data very well, we seem
to accurately capture the effects of commodity prices on the macroeconomy.
While our results are broadly in line with the literature, our model-based approach
provides several interesting, additional insights. The recent literature suggests that
ﬂuctuations in oil prices have little, if any, macroeconomic impact (Jones et al., 2004),
and that the transmission occurs primarily via the demand side (Hamilton 1988, 2003).
Our ﬁndings qualify both statements. First, we ﬁnd that higher oil prices have only
small (but still statistically signiﬁcant) effects on trend growth, but they lower the level
of GDP permanently. Second, our results indicate that the most likely channel in the
short term is not the demand side effect, but the supply side channel. This conﬁrms the
notion put forward in Rasche and Tatom (1977) and Bruno (1984) that higher energy
prices act in a similar way as technological regress. Third, our ﬁndings regarding the
monetary policy response to higher oil prices qualify the results of Cologni and Manera
(2008). All countries respond to higher oil prices by increasing interest rates, but real
interest rates become negative, as the rise in inﬂation more than offsets the increase in
interest rates. Consequently, monetary policy remains stimulative – the only exception
is a positive shock to oil demand, to which U.S. monetary policy responds with tighter
real interest rates (conﬁrming that the distinction between oil supply and oil demand
shocks made in Kilian, 2009, is important). Lastly, when considering the possibility
that central bank might not fully understand the transmission of energy prices and
consequently set monetary policy incorrectly, it turns out that oil price movements
have only minor effects on the economy as a whole, and consequently the effects are
likely to be too small to lead to policy errors with sizable economic consequences.
Several avenues exist for extending this study. First, our model does not distinguish
between demand for different consumption goods. A richer model could split out the
demand for durable and non-durable goods, which would allow testing the hypothesis
that higher energy prices depresses the demand for durable consumer goods (notably
cars). Second, our model treats developments in the rest of the world exogenously, and
arguably a more realistic model response for variables such as exchange rates could be
25derived in a fully-blown two-country setup. Lastly, we only provide estimates for three
countries, limiting the scope to investigate what drives the differences in the impact of
energy prices on trend growth between countries. Plausible hypothesis include that the
impact depends on the oil intensity of production, or the degree to which oil is imported
or exported. We leave these issues for future research.
A Appendix
A.1 Robustness checks
We have conducted a number of robustness checks, investigating different modelling
choices for energy prices. In what follows, we discuss the sensitivity of our results,
based on the the baseline model for the United States.21
Oil prices versus broader indices of commodity prices Our ﬁrst robustness broad-
ens the focus from oil prices to larger sets of commodity prices. One of the develop-
ments witnessed in the 1970s, as well as in the period 2007/08, is that broad indices
of commodity prices increased as the same time as oil prices soared. One possible
explanation for this development is that the rise in oil prices over these periods reﬂects
strong demand (which also drives up prices for other commodities), not supply con-
straints speciﬁc to the oil sector (such as, for instance, the spike in oil prices in the
early 1990s, which was clearly related to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). If our model is
able to distinguish between these effects, our results shold not change materially.
To test for this possibility, we replace the price of crude oil by the BIS’ commodity
price index in place of crude oil.22 As can be seen in the second and third column of
table 8, our estimated effect on trend growth (lg) is slightly higher than in our baseline
model. Given that an increase in a broad range of commodities can be expected to
have larger effects on the production function than isolated price increases in oil, it
21In addition to the robustness checks reported below, we also estimated a version of our model for the
United States with exogenous oil prices (that is, analogous to our models for the UK and Canada, we assume
that eq. (15) holds for the United States, too). Again our results were robust, as oil prices still had a small,
yet signiﬁcant effect on trend growth.
22An alternative measure would be the IMF’s commodity price index, but this series starts only in 1992.
Over the period where data for both are available, they are highly correlated (around 0.99 both in levels and
ﬁrst differences).
26is not surprising that lg is higher, but note that overall the key insights remain fairly
unchanged.
Oil intensity Energy usage as input to production has declined substantially in most
countries since the 1980s, and Guilloux and Kharroubi (2008) show that the impact of
commodity import price inﬂation on CPI inﬂation depends on the volume of commod-
ity imports. In our second robustness check we control for oil intensity by replacing
the oil price by a constructed series, where we pre-multiply oil prices by a measure of
energy consumption, relative to GDP. Essentially, this ampliﬁes the oil price increase
in the 1970s, relative to the more recent period. In terms of the model, we replace eq.
(10) by the following:
gT
t = (1 rg)gss+rggT
t 1+ ¯ lgpt +e
g
t ;
where ¯ lg = k lg. As weighting factor k we again use thousands of barrels of oil
per day, divided by billions of GDP in constant 2000 dollars. As can be seen in the
fourth and ﬁfth column of table 8, the results do not change much, with a slight drop in
signiﬁcance for some parameters (the value of the likelihood function is close to, but
lower than for the baseline U.S. model). The estimated coefﬁcient for lg – the effect
of oil prices on trend growth – is slightly lower, reﬂecting that we multiplied the data
by k > 1 (consequently, lg is divided by the same factor k).
Asymmetric effects A number of previous studies have considered the case that the
macroeconomic effects of energy price shocks might be asymmetric. Mork (1989),
Hooker (1983) and Bernanke et al. (1997) found that higher oil price lead to declines
in output, while lower oil prices do not seem to lead to increase in output. An intuitive
explanation for this effect is that any change to the price of energy requires changes in
the capital stock, which is why lower energy prices may require investment in different
technologytoreapthefullbeneﬁt. Astheinitialinvestmenttakestimes, outputdoesnot
immediately increase in response to lower energy prices. Note, however, that Kilian
and Vigfusson (2009) show in a recent study that estimates of asymmetric effects in
most previous studies were obtained incorrectly, possibly invalidating these results.23
23Grifﬁn and Schulman (2005) use a panel of OECD countries covering 1961 to 1999 and show that sym-
metric price responses of energy and oil demand functions cannot be rejected, after controlling for changes
in energy consumption.
27To investigate this issue in our last robustness check, we replaced our simple oil
price series with a series inspired by Hamilton (1996) and compare current oil prices
with prices during the four quarters preceding the current quarter. If the price in a
given quarter is greater than the largest price over the preceding four quarters, we set
the value equal to one (‘price increase’), and zero otherwise (‘no increase’). Then, we
take this constructed series, and include it in the model as an explicit shock process,
which is multiplied into two lambda coefﬁcients – lg (up) and lg (no chg.) – such that
in each period, one of the coefﬁcients is estimated.
The results for asymmetric effects are reported in the sixth and seventh column
of table 8. As can be seen, both parameter estimates of the asymmetry parameter lg
are signiﬁcant, but the estimates values are very close. This supports the notion that
possible asymmetries are probably of second order.
A.2 Detrending and model validation checks
There are multiple ways to ensure stationarity of the series used for the estimation. The
analysis was done using an HP ﬁlter; other solutions could be to use ﬁrst differences.
Table 9 compares different detrending methods for oil prices. The HP ﬁlter is clearly
the preferred method, yielding the highest likelihood ratio. Figure 6 shows the actual
series, after they have been rendered stationary by applying an HP ﬁlter, and the model-
generated data. As can be seen, both series are very close.
Table 2 reports the estimated autocorrelation coefﬁcients and compares them to the
empirical moments. As can be seen, the differences are usually small. Taken together,
these tests provide further evidence that our model matches the data very well.
28Commodity Index Intensity Adjusted Asymmetric Effects
Parameter Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate p-value
Potential Output Growth
g 0.0279 0.0000 0.0058 0.3070 0.0280 0.0000
rg 0.2157 0.0090 0.2647 0.0016 0.2668 0.0013
lg -0.0159 0.0027 -0.0043 0.2475
lg (up) -0.0103 0.0133
lg (no chg.) -0.0102 0.0054
Monetary Policy Rule
rR 0.6417 0.0001 0.7391 0.0000 0.6494 0.0015
rp 0.7819 0.0853 0.6408 0.0393 0.4921 0.0613
ry 0.0986 0.0608 0.0848 0.0255 0.1086 0.0490
Supply (Phillips Curve)
b0 0.7074 0.0871 0.6425 0.0958 0.7651 0.0806
by 0.6159 0.0082 0.6264 0.0110 0.0215 0.3839
bpt 1 0.2875 0.0001 0.3575 0.0000 0.2349 0.0002
bpt+1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
bp 0.0051 0.1362 0.0000 0.0000
Demand (IS Curve)
gy 0.0411 0.1152 0.0453 0.1247 0.0000 1.0000
gr -0.0563 0.0002 -0.0530 0.0003 -0.0584 0.0011
gs 0.0562 0.0002 0.0533 0.0003 0.0620 0.0010
gy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
U.S. Oil Demand
f0 -3.2917 0.0882 -6.8611 0.0005 -7.1496 0.0003
fy 8.9833 0.0380 6.8611 0.0007 7.1496 0.0000
fp -5.6916 0.1866 -3.4931 0.0783 -3.7745 0.0000
World Net Oil Supply
rQS 0.3796 0.0000 0.3841 0.0000 0.3765 0.0000
lp 0.0965 0.0000 0.0176 0.2014 0.0175 0.0196
Likelihood -4,328.4 -4,260.5 -4,260.3
Obs 149 149 149
d.f. 121 122 118
Table 8: Robustness checks for the United States (maximum likelihood estimates of
structural parameters)
29Transformation Observable lg (t-stat) Likelihood
HP Filter Log deviations from SS -0.0094 (3.2) -4276.6
Linear Filter Log deviations from SS -0.0009 (1.1) -4069.4
First Difference First Difference 0.0000 (0.02) -4084.9
First Difference Log Difference 0.0000 (0.02) -4084.9
Log Difference First Difference 0.0000 (0.03) -4089.1
Log Difference Log Difference 0.0000 (0.01) -4089.1
Log Difference Log deviations from SS Supply: 0.0102 (1.3)
Demand: -0.0021 (1.2) -4047.6
All results are from the model for the United States
 This version allows features oil supply and demand shocks in the growth equation.




















Figure 6: Model series and actual oil prices for the United States
30United States United Kingdom Canada
Series s(x;gt) s(x) s(x;gt) s(x) s(x;gt) s(x)
Output Growth 0.42 0.34 0.24
Exchange Rate 0.27 0.57 0.36 0.24 0.40 0.86
Inﬂation 0.36 0.97 0.45 0.84 0.45 0.98
Interest Rates 0.31 0.94 0.27 0.97 0.36 0.95
Oil Price 0.45 0.96 0.36 0.23 0.27 0.95
Oil Imports 0.40 0.99
 Null: Equal Variance
Table 10: Test of equality of moments (p-values of F-tests)
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